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Reports
This part of the EDPL hosts reports in which our correspondents keep readers abreast of various na-
tional data protection developments in Europe, as well as on the most recent questions in different
privacy policy areas. The Reports are organised in cooperation with the Institute of European Media
Law (EMR) in Saarbrücken (www.emr-sb.de) of which the Reports Editor Mark D. Cole is Director for
Academic Affairs. If you are interested in contributing or would like to comment, please contact him
at mark.cole@uni.lu.
Introduction
Recent Developments and Overview of the Country and
Practitioners’ Reports
2016 has been a year with lots of significant develop-
ments in the area of data protection law. Foremost,
with the entry into force of the General Data Protec-
tion Regulation (GDPR), we now have a clear target
date for its applicability andobviously this new forth-
coming era is creating a lot of activity: on the side of
legislators in the Member States, trying to find the
right way to fill the gaps or spaces left by the GDPR;
on the sideofDataProtectionAuthorities (DPAs), get-
ting ready to implement the new procedures; on the
side of consumers and users, understanding the im-
pact some of the novelties will bring; and last but not
least, on the side of businesses, and alongside with
them, the legal profession, having to amplify their
efforts to meet compliance requirements with the
GDPR. Unsurprisingly therefore in many of the re-
ports we were able to share with you, the country ex-
perts already put the developments into the perspec-
tive of the forthcoming Regulation and we will con-
tinue to do so increasingly in the coming year when
the preparatory activities will unfold even more.
In accordance with the above, in this issue’s Re-
ports Section we have an overview in the ‘Practition-
er’s Corner’ that deals exactly with the consequences
and the need for adaptation the new General Data
Protection Regulation will bring for businesses. As
regular readers will know, we have introduced the
‘Practitioner’s Corner’ recently in order to give
lawyers, DPA members, company legal counsels and
others the opportunity to highlight in a condensed
manner specific privacy and data protection ques-
tions which do not relate to a Member State but are
of overarching interest. We are very pleased to have
a long-standing practitioner and expert in the field
that has already contributed regularly in the past to
the academic and practice-oriented debates with nu-
merous publications, to take responsibility for gath-
ering contributions in this section: I would like to
welcome Axel Freiherr von dem Bussche in this new
role! As the author of this edition’s Practitioner re-
port he describes together with Anja Zeiter the mod-
ifications that will be required in data protection
management, how the relationship between con-
trollers andprocessorswill change, aswell as thenew
scopeofdata subjects’ rights. The report also explains
how informed consent as the central basis for data
processing will need to be obtained from the data
subject in the future, andhow the framework of sanc-
tions will look like. The authors identify transparen-
cy as one of the key principles that is enshrined in a
series of information and notification obligations
throughout the GDPR and conclude thatwith around
180 opening clauses it will remain to be seenwhether
this new legislative act can keep the promise of es-
tablishing a more uniform data protection regime in
the EU.
Before the concluding Practitioner’s report this
time we have a number of contributions that also go
beyond the scope of a national development and
present very relevant general aspects of data protec-
tion. The focus this time is on a selected topic, which
has been analysed in-depth and in a comparative
manner by a research group around Indra Spiecker
gen. Döhmann and Olivia Tambou. The report, com-
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prehensively covering the situation regarding the
regulation of commercial profiling in Germany,
France, UK, US, Brazil and Australia, and therefore
longer than our usual single-country reports,
presents a major part of the outcome of a seminar
held at the University of Paris Dauphine in June of
this year. The authors note considerable differences
in the regulatory approaches to this subject that law-
makers in the countries included in the survey have
taken. They highlight what might be perceived as a
striking fact: that the United States, up to now not
believed to be at the forefront of limiting the use of
personal data across the board, have begun to estab-
lish rather clear-cut rules governing the use of this
kind of information for profiling purposes. On the
other hand, the comparative view on legislation in
Germany, France and theUKhas demonstrated, once
again, that harmonisation of national data protection
laws by the Directive 95/46/EC has remained limit-
ed. Chances are that the future applicability of the
GDPR will bring an important change in this regard
as it addresses profiling specifically. However the up-
coming Brexit might rather have a scattering effect.
The report concludes that also other legal fields, such
asconsumerprotectionand telecommunications law,
which provide rules applicable to profiling, too, will
need to be consideredwhen trying to strike a balance
between the commercial interests of those applying
this still new business practice and the personality
rights of data subjects.
The ethical questions of personal data processing
are in the centre of a report by Charles Raab and
Roger Clarke shedding some light on the content and
practicality of a UK government draft entitled ‘Data
Science Ethical Framework’. While the authors wel-
come the idea of introducing a new framework in
this field that goes beyondmere compliancewith the
laws on data protection, their analysis comes to the
conclusion that the draft presented to the public does
not achieve this goal as it has severe shortcomings.
The authors suggest that the framework had been de-
veloped not to solve the ethical issue of what kinds
of data processing were to be regarded as having a
positive or negative impact, but to serve as a fig leaf
at the disposal of public administration to refer to
when in need of an authority signing off any type of
controversialdataprocessingactivity.The report con-
cludes with an appeal to the Cabinet Office to correct
these deficiencies swiftly and to come up with a new
and more compelling version that is made available
to the wider public so as to ensure a broad participa-
tion in the furtherdevelopmentof thedocument.Cer-
tainly, the topic of Data Ethics will continue to be on
the agenda in the UK as well as across the European
Union as it is regarded to give an additional layer be-
yond the purely legal approach to applying data pro-
tection rules.
From the perspective of a German data protection
authority, Kristin Benedikt reports about an interest-
ing investigation into the data protection compliance
of 13 smart TV sets that German DPAs have present-
ed to the public in 2015. The author first lays out the
outcome of a technical functions survey and identi-
fies the different providers involved in the process-
ing of personal data emanating from the smart TV
device as it is operated by the end-user. This setting
forms the basis for a legal analysis reviewing the ad-
herence of the actors with the applicable data protec-
tion legislative framework. The report concludes by
explaining the specific obligations applying to smart
TV service providers, including the device manufac-
turers, HbbTV and app providers, operators of per-
sonalised recommendation services and processors
acting on behalf of the data controller. This overview
shows that even for a specific issue such as the pro-
vision and use of smart TV sets a whole range of re-
sponsible actors are on the scene and it is necessary
to very clearly distinguish the different activities and
derived from that responsibilities. In view of the
widespread use of smart TVs this report adds an im-
portant facet to a previous report in our section on
obligations of providers of such services1.
The final country report by Jan Tomíšek provides
us with an insight into the way the Czech legislator
has dealt with data protection issues in the sector of
electronic healthcare (also known as ‘eHealth’). Giv-
en that health data are among the most sensitive cat-
egories of information about an individual, the au-
thor stresses the need for strong safeguards and crit-
icises, in particular, the current lack of those in the
regulation governing the National Health Informa-
tion System. The database processing health data on
a wide scale for statistical purposes has recently seen
some amendments allowing formore data collection
and merging, but does not provide for elevated secu-
rity measures. The author also points to current le-
1 See Sebastian Schweda, ‘German Data Protection Authorities
Issue Privacy Guidelines for Smart TV Services’ (2016) 1 EDPL
108-111.
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gal uncertainties with regard to the maintenance of
health records, which made it impossible to switch
to a system keeping these data in an electronic-only
form. A reform of the regime in force, he suggests,
is therefore urgently needed, but the recently pre-
sented National Strategy for Electronic Healthcare,
envisaged to cope with the identified problems, in-
cludes some contentious issues that still needs some
more debate in his view.
We hope that readers will enjoy the present selec-
tion of reports covering a diverse range of country-
specific and thematic developmentswhich, as the ex-
tensive piece on profiling shows in a particularly
telling way, in many cases outreaches European bor-
ders and sheds light on developments elsewhere that
are relevant for us in Europe. As always, the editors
together with the Institute of European Media Law
(EMR)welcome any comments youmay have or sug-
gestions for future reports at <mark.cole@uni.lu>.
Mark D Cole
Director for Academic Affairs, EMR
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Multi-Country
The Regulation of Commercial Profiling – A Comparative Analysis
Indra Spiecker genannt Döhmann and Olivia Tambou, Paul Bernal, Margaret Hu, Carlos
Alberto Molinaro, Elsa Negre, Ingo Wolfgang Sarlet, Laura Schertel Mendes, Normann
Witzleb and Florian Yger*
The authors, all data protection experts, discuss the
status of the relevant data protection regulatory
framework on profiling in the business sector in sev-
eral countriesworldwide, from the constitutional lev-
el to some individual regulation including the gener-
al attitude towards the topic. The EU perspective is
presented on the basis of the present directives as
well as the General Data Protection Regulation. The
United Kingdom, Germany and France, as three of
the largest EUMember States with partly highly dif-
fering regulatory approaches represent Member
State law. Australia, Brazil and the US regulation ex-
emplify the different integration of data protection
standards and different models of approaching pro-
filing in the globalised IT world.**
I. Introduction
In surveys, citizens regularly express significant con-
cern about the gathering of profiling information for
commercial and other purposes.1This fear of becom-
ing a transparent citizen, of being controlled and po-
tentially manipulated by the state or by companies
with superior information, has been aprominent rea-
son for data protection from its very beginnings.2 In-
formation service providers, on the other hand, have
long searched for measures to learn more about the
behaviour, preferences and decisions of their clients,
customers (and potential clients and customers) and
citizens on the basis of collective and group informa-
tion, in order to create contracts and relationships
based on more precise predictions and individual
evaluations of risk. The rise of high velocity, high vol-
ume and high variety data processing, often referred
to as ‘Big’ or ‘Smart’ Data, has made these analyses
not only more likely, but also more accessible. As a
result, profiling has become an every-daymeasure in
evaluating counterparts, both by the state and by pri-
vate companies.
The conflict between the interests of the individ-
ual in preserving their privacy and restricting access
* Indra Spiecker genannt Döhmann, LL.M. (Georgetown), holds
the Chair in Public and Administrative Law, Information Law,
Environmental Law and Legal Theory at Goethe-University
Frankfurt a.M., Germany; Olivia Tambou is Associate Professor
at the Université Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University,
Cr2D, France; Paul Bernal is Lecturer in Information Technology,
Intellectual Property and Media Law at the University of East
Anglia Law School, Great Britain; Margaret Hu serves as Asso-
ciate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of
Law, USA; Carlos Alberto Molinaro is Professor at Pontifical
Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS), Brazil;
Elsa Negre is Assistant Professor in Computer Sciences at Univer-
sité Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University, CNRS UMR 7243,
LAMSADE, Data Science TeamFrance; Ingo Wolfgang Sarlet is
Professor at Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul
(PUCRS), Brazil; Laura Schertel Mendes serves as Professor at
the University of Brasília (UnB) and at the Institute for Public
Law of Brasília (IDP), Brazil; Normann Witzleb is Associate
Professor and Deputy Director of the Centre for Commercial
Law and Regulatory Studies at the Faculty of Law, Monash
University, Australia; Florian Yger is Assistant Professor in Com-
puter Sciences at Université Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research
University, CNRS UMR 7243, LAMSADE, Data Science Team,
France.
We would like to thank the Université Paris-Dauphine for their
support to a workshop in June 2016 in which this paper and
project were developed. Olivia Tambou also thanks Alexandre
Lercher for his contributions on the French law; Indra Spiecker
thanks Dirk Muellmann for his contributions on the German law.
** This report is part of an ongoing larger project comparing the
legal status of profiling initiated by Olivia Tambou. If you are
interested in our working group, please contact Olivia Tambou
(<olivia.tambou@dauphine.fr>) or Indra Spiecker (<spiecker@jur
.uni-frankfurt.de>).
1 See eg European Commission, Data Protection Report (Special
Eurobarometer 431, 2015) 39 <http://ec.europa.eu/public
_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_431_en.pdf> accessed 11 November
2016; or Office of the Australian Information Commissioner,
Community Attitudes to Privacy survey (Research report, 2013)
17 et seq <https://www.oaic.gov.au/images/documents/privacy/
privacy-resources/privacy-reports/2013-community-attitudes-to
-privacy-survey-report.pdf> accessed 11 November 2016.
2 Gloria González Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protec-
tion as a Fundamental Right of the EU (Springer 2014) 55.
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to and use of their personal information and the in-
terests of companies and states to knowmore about
their customers and citizens in order to provide
more targeted and efficient services call for balanced
regulation. However, explicit regulation of profiling
does not at present exist within consumer protec-
tion law, privacy law or data protection law. And
even the new EU General Data Protection Regula-
tion (GDPR),which aims tomodernise and standard-
ise the data protection framework across the EU
from 2018, contains only limited regulation on pro-
filing.
Profiling can be described as the process of gath-
ering information and personal data, combining
this individualised data with other (eg, personal,
factual, statistical) data and analysing it through al-
gorithms with the aim of predicting a person’s fu-
ture conditions, decisions or behaviour.3 These dif-
ferent steps do not all necessarily fall under the
scope of data protection laws, as not all of them al-
ways process personal data. This is true especially
for the intermediate steps of combining or reassem-
bling of data, where the personal data is often
merged into grouped information about large num-
bers of individuals and statistical content. It would
therefore be desirable to have a regulation that ad-
dresses all relevant steps in profiling. As this, how-
ever, is not the case, this article, based on informed
computer science input about the technical possi-
bilities and restrictions, aims to identify the legal
status quo. We focus on profiling laws of general
application; we do not analyse sector-specific reg-
ulation such as in banking or credit-rating.4As pro-
filing uses information available worldwide and
produces results that are of interest everywhere in
a globalised world, a national approach or even an
EU-wide approach would in general not seem to be
sufficient. We have therefore adopted a compara-
tive approach that includes reports from promi-
nent EU Member States (Germany, France and the
UK5) as well as theUS, Brazil andAustralia. Asmost
Asian countries, in particularChina and India, have
little regulation and even less enforcement on da-
ta protection to date,6 a comparative view at this
point would not be fruitful. We also exclude the
use of profiling by state authorities and non-com-
mercial entities such as political parties. They fol-
low to a great extent, the individual public and ad-
ministrative legal framework of each individual
state.
The paper will first describe how profiling oper-
ates and what computer scientists view as the mech-
anisms and restrictions of profiling (II.). It will then
continue with the relevant European framework
(III.), concentrating on the expected normative stan-
dards of the GDPR. As we will show, the GDPR does
not provide for strict guidelines on profiling. Thus,
the present interpretations and standards in the EU
Member States will be of continuing importance, as
they present the starting point also for future EU
practice, eg, in the consistency mechanismwhich re-
quires Member States’ data protection authorities to
cooperate in order to reach a common decision. We
will then look at how the various legal issues raised
by profiling are dealt with by the jurisdictions under
consideration (IV.). The paper concludes with a look
at future prospects (V.).
II. What Is Profiling?
In this section, we explain the concept of profiling
as understood by computer science. This overview
will consider the data acquisition and analysis
processes, and also describe techniques to limit the
effects of profiling.
1. Data Acquisition
The data acquisition chain is the set of elements nec-
essary to ‘capture’ data from its creation (by a user
or a machine) to its storage for immediate or future
use.We focus on the acquisition of data through user
profiles (which can contain a large amount of user
information including preferences), cookies (which
store user navigation data) and traces (which record
activity and user identity).
3 A closer technical description of profiling follows infra II.
4 The specific regulation of profiling in the banking sector and by
credit agencies will need to be looked at separately. A major
concern here is the use of data from one sector for other purposes
than the original one.
5 As neither the form nor the full consequences of Brexit are not
currently clear, it must be noted that the UK may sooner or
later deviate from EU law, and in particular the EU data protec-
tion regime.
6 In the case of India, much data processing involving European
citizens is performed on the basis of standard contract clauses
assuring European level of data protection.
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a. User Profile and Preferences
Auser profile is a set of personal data associatedwith
a specific user or a customised desktop environment.
A profile7 therefore refers to the digital representa-
tion of a person's identity. Profiles can be construct-
ed through explicit or implicit data collection. Data
collection is explicitwhen theuser explicitlyprovides
personal information, for example, classifies a collec-
tion of items according to his/her preferences or cre-
ates a list of interesting features. In contrast, data col-
lection is implicit8when preferences/opinions of the
user are induced from the actions of the user, ie what
elements were viewed, or by keeping track of the
user's navigation (purchases; items where the user
has lingered, etc). Note that users tend to have little
patience and/or willingness to give information
about their preferences, so that the systems have a
very incomplete picture of the users’ preferences. In
order to gainmore information, additional user pref-
erences are inferred9 from the induced/elicited or ob-
served preferences, based on assumptions.10 11
b. Cookies
A cookie12 is a small text file that is downloaded to
a user’s device and saved in the web browser when
users access a particular website. Cookies allow the
storage of user data (such as IP addresses, passwords,
items in an online shopping cart) or users’ browsing
activity (including clicking particular buttons, log-
ging in) in order to facilitate navigation and enable
some features.Most modern browsers allow users to
decide whether to accept or reject cookies. Users can
usually also determine the cookie’s expiry.13 While
cookies improve the convenience of web browsing,
they have always been controversial because they
store information that can potentially be exploited
by third parties. This is one of the reasons why the
EU regulated the use of cookies in the so-called ‘Cook-
ies Directive’.14
c. Traces
Like a trace left in the snow, a user leaves a certain
number of clues in form of data recorded by the serv-
er hosting thevisitedwebsite.Among themare traces
related to the computer such as the IP address, the
environment variable (information about the operat-
ing system running on the computer, usually useful
to adapt the display of a website) and traces related
to past searches of a user (on a web search engine).
The latter traces can reveal user interests (keywords
used), visited websites (links chosen within search
results), location (via the IP address) and dates of ac-
cess. A trace can be used for analysing a user’s behav-
iour (eg, in order to enhance the quality of web nav-
igation on the website or in order to display relevant
advertisement).
d. Metadata/Data
Contextual information on collected data is called
metadata. Metadata can be thought of as data about
data, eg the metadata of an email would consist of
the sender, the recipient, the timestamp, the IP ad-
dresses etc. By its nature, metadata is often less di-
rectly protected (for example, it is created by default
by most softwares for text and images) and it can of-
ten be easier to collect than the data itself. Metadata
are simple but structured data, and lots of informa-
tion can be deduced from it, eg thewidth, quality and
intensity of someone’s personal network could be re-
7 Riddhiman Ghosh and Mohamed E Dekhil, ‘Discovering user
profiles’ (ACM Digital Library, Proceedings of the 18th interna-
tional conference on World wide web (WWW '09), Madrid,
Spain, 20-24 April 2009) 1233-1234.
8 Alan Mislove et al, ‘You are who you know: inferring user profiles
in online social networks’ (ACM Digital Library, Proceedings of
the Third ACM International Conference on Web Search and
Data Mining (WSDM '10), New York, USA, 3-6 February 2010)
251-260.
9 Dianne Kelly and Jaime Teevan, ‘Implicit Feedback for Inferring
User Preference: A Bibliography’, SIGIR Forum 37, 2 (2003) 18 et
seq.
10 Nic Wilson, Anne-Marie George, and Barry O’Sullivan, ‘Compu-
tation and Complexity of Preference Inference Based on Hierar-
chical Models’ in Qiang Yang and Michael Wooldridge (eds),
Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (IJCAI'15) (AAAI Press 2015) 3271 et seq.
11 Vincent Schickel-Zuber and Boi Faltings, ‘Inferring user’s prefer-
ences using ontologies’ in Anthony Cohn (ed), Proceedings of the
21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
(AAAI'06) (AAAI Press 2006) 1413-1418.
12 David Kristol, ‘HTTP Cookies: Standards, privacy, and politics’
(November 2001) 1(2) ACM Transactions on Internet Technology
151-198.
13 Eg in France, a cookie has a maximum lifespan of 13 months, see
<http://www.cnil.fr/fr/cookies-traceurs-que-dit-la-loi> accessed 11
November 2016
14 Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC
on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic com-
munications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC con-
cerning the processing of personal data and the protection of
privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation
(EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities
responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws
[2009] OJ L 337/11.
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constructed from the email’s metadata. In practice,
the metadata can be a rough summary of the data it-
self and it is difficult to make a clear distinction be-
tween data and metadata as the metadata can be de-
duced from the data.
2. Data Analysis/Mining
Data analysis is a process of preprocessing (cleaning
and transforming) data and applying relevant mod-
els to them in order to automatically discover useful
informationand to support decision-making.The fol-
lowing items describe different aspects of informa-
tion selection and evaluation processes that are used
in profiling.
a. Data Mining/Machine Learning
Data mining and machine learning are two interdis-
ciplinary subfields of Artificial Intelligence (AI) at
the crossing of several other domains (statistics, ap-
pliedmathematics and computer science). Those two
subfields consist of expressing the data in a mathe-
matical framework.Theyuseaparticularvocabulary:
data will be referred to as population or individuals.
A population is the set of individuals a study is inter-
ested in. Every individual is described by the same
set of characteristics (knownas variables or features).
Relationships between individuals, between vari-
ables or between individuals andvariables are sought
in order to model behaviour. The philosophy is to in-
volve the human as little as possible in the creation
of a predictive model. Thus, the more data are gath-
ered, the better the algorithms will perform (hence
the term ‘Big Data’). However, if an algorithm is fed
with bad, unreliable, noisy or corrupted data, its pre-
diction will be bad as well.
Data mining consists of discovering and extract-
ing non-trivial patterns and behaviour in large
datasets (such as traces). Those discovered patterns
are then used as a means of analysis and sometimes
for prediction of behaviour and decisions. Machine
learning is often described as the field giving to com-
puters the ability to learn without being explicitly
programmed. The computer is trained to recognise
some behaviour from examples (positives or nega-
tives). It then acquires this ability to understand be-
haviour or complex situations without having been
explicitly programmed with a description of those
situations. The difference between the two fields is
not always simple. In general, however, data mining
mainly focuses on the analysis and explorationwhile
machine learning focuses on decision-making.
b. Recommendations
Users face ever-increasing quantities of information,
due to increased calculation and storage capacity,15
which makes it increasingly difficult to know exact-
ly what information to look for and where. Recom-
mender systems16 guide users in their exploration of
data by a specific form of information filtering, in or-
der to obtain relevant information. Generally, based
on certain reference characteristics,17 the recommen-
dation process aims to predict the ‘opinion’ a user
will have of each item and to recommend items with
the best predicted ‘opinion’.
3. Technologies Invoked to Limit Profiling
The following techniques describe ways how to lim-
it profiling.
a. Data Minimisation
In the context of profiling, data minimisationmeans
extracting only what is relevant to the task to be
solved. The goal must be clearly defined beforehand
to help decide the life span of the collected data. Such
an approach contradicts the usual approach in ma-
chine learning and data mining where in principle
more data results in better algorithmic predictions.
In practice, a trade-off has to be found to reduce the
quantity whilst gathering the relevant data.18 In
terms of privacy, storing less data can be good for the
individuals. For companies, there ismay be also a tip-
15 A study of the UCLA Berkeley estimates the quantity of informa-
tion newly created each year at approximately two exabytes per
year (1 exabyte = 1018 bytes) <http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/
research/projects/how-much-info-2003/> accessed 11 November
2016.
16 Elsa Negre, Information and Recommender Systems (Wiley 2016)
7.
17 These characteristics may come eg from the information items
themselves (a content-based approach) or the social environment
(collaborative filtering) and are based on the user profile, some
contextual parameters, the knowledge model, etc.
18 Katrin Borcea-Pfitzmann, Andreas Pfitzmann and Manuela Berg,
‘Privacy 3.0 := Data Minimization + User Control + Contextual
Integrity’ (2011) 53(1) Information Technology 34-40.
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ping point where even though more data is accumu-
lated, the algorithms will behave the same, and the
profit, generated by using those algorithms, will stay
the same while the cost of storing data would rise.
b. Encryption
In cryptography, encryption consists in altering the
content of a document to prevent its being under-
stood by anyone without the ‘key’ to the encryption.
This ‘key’ must be communicated between the par-
ties exchanging the document.
Classically, encrypting a document is depicted as
putting a lock on a trunk. Knowledge of how a lock
operates is not enough to open it without the key.
Similarly, knowing the algorithm used for encrypt-
ing a document is not enough to access its content
without this key. Just as in practice there are many
ways to force a lock or to pick it, there are ways to
break encryption.
Encryption is a basic tool for protecting data and
preventing access to (and diffusion of) it, which is
even more important when a database contains sen-
sitive or personal data that was not anonymised. The
access to such a database would make the profiling
of any particular user whose data are stored in that
database an easy task.19
c. Anonymisation/Pseudonymisation
Anonymisation consists of modifying the data con-
tent (or structure) to make it very difficult (if not im-
possible) to identify a particular individual. As op-
posed to encryption,where the sender and the receiv-
er are supposed to be able to read the message, it is
designed to prevent the interpretation of the data by
anyone and it is intended not to be reversible.
Anonymisation of a dataset is a complex task as the
data has to bemodified in order tomake a given user
unidentifiable butwithout significantly reducing the
overall quality of the data. Furthermore, anonymisa-
tion should not add too much ‘noise’ or any harmful
artefact to the data. 20 21
Pseudonymisation can be viewed as a special case
of anonymisationwhereonly themost sensitiveparts
of the data are replaced by aliases, typically names
or addresses. Anonymisation and pseudonymisation
ensure that the profile of any given user cannot be
recognised.22
d. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy lies at the interface between ma-
chine learning, anonymisation and cryptography
and proposes to modify the data (or its structure) in
order to maximise the accuracy of queries from sta-
tistical databases and at the same time to minimise
the chances of identifying its records. In otherwords,
it is a machine learning efficient anonymisation.
Hence, it prevents the access to any particular user’s
profile while ensuring that relevant statistics can be
computed on the data.23
III. The European Approach to Profiling
1. Council of Europe Recommendations
on Profiling and EU Regulatory
Framework
The Council of Europe adopted a set of principles
for all forms of personal data processing using pro-
filing techniques in 2010, and recommended to
Member States that they should be implemented
into domestic law.24 These recommendations do
not form part of the EU regulatory framework on
profiling, which consists of regulation on three lev-
els:
• Article 7 (respect for private and family life) and
Article 8 (protection of personal data) of the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union,25 together with Article 16 of the Treaty on
19 Murat Ak et al, ‘Efficient broadcast encryption with user profiles’
(2010) 180(6) Information Sciences 1060-1072.
20 Marcus Schöller, Thomas Gamer and Christoph P Mayer, ‘Pk-
tAnon – A Generic Framework for Profile-based Traffic
Anonymization’ (2008) 31(2) Praxis der Informationsverarbeitung
und Kommunikation 76-81.
21 UK ICO, Anonymisation: managing data protection risk code of
practice (2012) <https://ico.org.uk/media/1061/anonymisation
-code.pdf> accessed 11 November 2016.
22 Slaughter and May, ‘Personal data, anonymisation and pseudo-
nymisation under the GDPR’ (July 2016) <https://www
.slaughterandmay.com/media/2535637/personal-data
-anonymisation-and-pseudonymisation-under-the-gdpr.pdf> ac-
cessed 11 November 2016.
23 Cynthia Dwork and Aaron Roth, ‘The Algorithmic Foundations of
Differential Privacy’ (2014) 9(3-4) Theoretical Computer Science
211-407.
24 Council of Europe, The protection of individuals with regard to
automatic processing of personal data in the context of profiling,
Recommendation CM/Rec (2010)13, 2010.
25 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2016] OJ
C202/389.
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the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),26
provide the constitutional framework for the pro-
tection of personal data.27 Additionally, Article 8
of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR)28alsoprotects the right to respect forone’s
private and family life.
• On the EU secondary law level, profiling falls
presently under the Data Protection Directive
(DPD).29 The so-called ‘E-privacy Directive’30 and
the Cookie Directive, currently under review, also
contain relevant regulation specifying eg the lev-
el of consent and the formal requirements for a
telecommunication-based consent.
• On a third level, non-binding sources such as rec-
ommendations or opinions, in particular those
adoptedby theArticle 29WorkingParty, influence
the legal regime covering profiling. This European
data protection framework has given Member
States ample room to develop their own defini-
tions, rules and interpretations on profiling.
This, however,will changewhen the newGeneral Da-
ta Protection Regulation (GDPR)31 will come into ef-
fect in May 2018. The GDPR will be directly applica-
ble to individuals in all Member States with only a
limited number of opening clauses leaving Member
States a leeway for own regulation.32 The following
sections will give an overview over the changes in
law relevant for profiling.
2. Definition of Profiling in the GDPR
While the DPD is silent on profiling, leaving its def-
inition and regulation largely to the Member States,
the GDPR expressly refers to profiling 23 times.33Ar-
ticle 4 includes the first definition of profiling in EU
Law, which will now be directly and identically ap-
plicable in the 28 EU Member States:
Profiling means any form of automated process-
ing of personal data consisting of the use of per-
sonal data to evaluate certain personal aspects re-
lating to a natural person, in particular to analyse
orpredict aspects concerning thatnatural person's
performance at work, economic situation, health,
personal preferences, interests, reliability, behav-
iour, location or movements.
Importantly, this definition refers to automatic pro-
cessing of personal information for the purposes of
evaluation. It includes the automatic processing of
personal data only, and therefore does not include
the collection and the analysis of anonymous data
for the creation of profiles, one of the major steps of
profiling. The processing of personal data often ap-
pears at the last stage of the inference, when the
groupprofile is applied to an individual person.How-
ever, this aspect may be covered by the rules govern-
ing automated decisions. Also, the very general def-
inition covers several procedures that were previous-
ly treated separately in the Member States, eg scor-
ing.
3. Ban on Decisions Solely Based on
Automated Processing: Article 22
GDPR
In Article 15, the DPD provided that individuals
should not be subject to a decision based solely on
automated processing of data where this decision
produces legal effects or similarly significantly af-
fects the data subject. The GDPR retains this princi-
26 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated
version 2016) [2016] OJ C 202/47.
27 The CJEU so far has not distinguished between these two provisions,
see eg Cases C-92, 93/09 Schecke, v Land Hessen, Eifert v Land
Hessen [CJEU, 2010] ECR 2010 I-11063 para 52; Cases C-468,
469/10 ASNEF v Administración del Estado, FECEMD v Adminis-
tración del Estado [CJEU, 2011] ECR 2011 I-12181, paras. 40 et
seqq; Case C-291/12 Schwarz v Stadt Bochum [CJEU, 2013]
ECLI:EU:C:2013:670, para 53; Cases C-293/1, C-594/12 Digital
Rights Ireland Ltd. v Minister for Communications, Marine and
Natural resources and others, Kärntener Landesregierung and
others [CJEU, 2014] ECKLI:EU:C:2014:238 paras 24, 29 et seq; Case
C-131/12 Google Spain v AEPD [CJEU, 2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317
para 74; Case C-362/14 Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner
[CJEU, 2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, paras 39, 66.
28 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, 213 UNTS 221.
29 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of
such data [1995] OJ L281/31.
30 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal
data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communica-
tions sector [2002] OJ L201/37.
31 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC [2016]
OJ L119/1.
32 See eg Alexander Benecke and Julian Wagner, ‘National Legisla-
tion within the Framework of the GDPR’ (2016) 3 EDPL 353-361.
33 In eight recitals (24, 60, 63, 70, 71, 72, 73, 91) and nine articles
(4, 13, 14, 15, 21, 22, 35, 47, 70).
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ple in Article 22, referring in the heading to profil-
ing as being one such form of processing. Recital 71
gives two illustrations, namely ‘an automatic refusal
of an online credit application or e-recruiting prac-
tices without any human intervention’.
While Article 22 GDPR generally prohibits auto-
mated decision-making on the basis of profiling, this
prohibition is subject to threewide exceptions. These
exceptions include that the data subject has explicit-
ly consented [Article 22(2)(c)], or that automated de-
cision-making is ‘necessary for entering into, or per-
formance of a contract’ [Article 22(2)(a)].34Whenone
of these exceptions applies, the data controller shall
establish suitablemeasures to safeguard thedata sub-
ject’s rights, freedoms and interests, including ‘the
right to obtain human intervention on the part of the
controller, to express her or his point of view and to
contest the decision’ [Article 22(3)]. This does, how-
ever, notmean that any human interventionwill nec-
essarily result in an outcome that deviates from the
decision proposed by the algorithm. Article 22(2)(b)
also contains an opening clause under which the
Member States can create further exceptions subject
to suitable protections.35 So, the individual is grant-
ed the possibility to protest against the phenomenon
of the ‘algorithmic governability’36. This right could
help the detection of automated decision-making
based on false profiles, but does not restrict the use
of profiles as such. This can be derived in connection
with the accountability principle and the new oblig-
ations for data controllers to conduct prior data pro-
tection impact assessments (Article 35) as well as for
companies or public authoritieswhose core activities
rely on profiling to have a Data Protection Officer
(Article 37).
4. General Data Processing Principles
Outside the scope ofArticle 22GDPR,most other reg-
ulatory requirements regarding profiling are derived
from general principles regarding data processing
(Article 5) and provisions regulating the lawfulness
of data processing (Article 6). Profiling is permitted
if either the data subject has consented or the data
processing is necessary for one of the named purpos-
es inArticle 6, typically because theprocessing is nec-
essary for the performance of a contract or in order
to take steps at the request of the data subject prior
to entering into a contract [Article 6(1)(b)] or because
processing is necessary for the purposes of the legit-
imate interests pursued by the controller or a third
party, provided these interests outweigh thedata sub-
ject’s rights and interests [Article 6(1)(f)].
5. Further Requirements for Profiling,
Especially Impact Assessment
Further requirements stem from the obligation of
transparency and the data subject’s information and
access rights (Articles 13-15). Article 21(1) creates a
right to object to data processing including profiling
where this processing is based on Article 6(1)(e) or
(f), which then requires the controller to ‘demon-
strate compelling legitimate grounds for the process-
ing’.
The GDPR provides for a new regulatory tool, the
‘data protection impact assessment’, Article 35 ff.
Such an impact assessment is generally required
where a ‘systematic and extensive evaluation of per-
sonal aspects relating to natural persons which is
based on automated processing, including profil-
ing’, is applied [Article 35(3)(a)]. If the assessment
indicates that processing would carry a high risk for
the fundamental rights of the data subject, the con-
troller must establish measures to mitigate the risk
and consult with the supervisory authority (Article
36). If necessary, decisions of the Data Protection
Authority (DPA) will be taken within the newly es-
tablished consistency mechanism, Article 63 et se-
qq, assuring an identical interpretation and identi-
cal measures taken in the Member States. This will
not necessarily lead to stricter rules on profiling, but
at least to a greater public availability of processing
measures taken and potentially to further public at-
tention.
34 While the Regulation itself does not define the scope of ‘neces-
sary’, recital 72 expresses the expectation that the European
Data Protection Board will issue guidance on profiling. The use of
special categories of data (ie sensitive data) is subject to further
restrictions. Recital 71 also notes that profiling should not con-
cern children.
35 Recital 71 envisages authorisations by Member States for the
purposes of fraud and tax-evasion monitoring and prevention.
36 Antoinette Rouvroy and Bernard Stiegler, Le régime de vérité
numérique, Socio, 4/2015, 113-140; Jan Philipp Albrecht and
Florian Jotzo, Das neue Datenschutzrecht der EU (Nomos 2017)
ch 3, paras 61, 64; Ulrich Dammann, ‘Erfolge und Defizite der
EU-Datenschutzgrundverordnung’ [2016] ZD 307, 312 et seqq;
Carolin Hohmann, ‘Rechte der betroffenen Person’ in Alexander
Roßnagel (ed), ‘Europäische Datenschutzgrundverordnung: Vor-
rang der Unionsrechts – Anwendbarkeit des nationalen Rechts’
(Nomos 2017), ch 3 IV, 147.
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IV. A Comparative View on Profiling
1. General Data Protection Legislation
Within the EU, the DPD continues to apply until 25
May 2018 (at which date it will be replaced by the
GDPR). The DPD does not regulate profiling explic-
itly and is, in any event, subject to transposition in-
to the law of Member States. Additionally, the rules
laid down in the E-Privacy Directive (as amended by
the Cookies Directive) apply.
The German Constitutional Court has derived a
right to informational self-determination from Arti-
cle 1(1), protecting human dignity, and Article 2(1),
protecting personal autonomy, of the Basic Law, the
German constitution. The Federal Data Protection
Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, BDSG) and theStates’
Data ProtectionActs provide the general legal frame-
work transposing the DPD. In regard to profiling, the
Tele Media Act (Telemediengesetz, TMG) also ap-
plies, establishing special requirements and privi-
leges in regard to telemedia services, ie Internet-
based information services other than telecommuni-
cation services. The relevant TMG provisions imple-
ment the E-Privacy Directive as well as the Cookies
Directive.
The French constitution does not contain an ex-
plicit guarantee for privacy37 or data protection. The
primary data protection statute is the Act n° 78-17 of
6 January 1978 on Information technology, data files
and civil liberties (1978 Act). It has been modified
once by Act n° 2004-801 (LCEN) which transposed
the DPD, and recently in October 2016 by the Digital
Republic Law38. The 1978 Act is quoted inmore than
130 laws. Some specific legislation, such as Article L.
34-1 and L 34-1-1 of the Postal and Electronic Com-
munications Code, stems from the E-Privacy and Da-
ta Retention directives.
The United Kingdom has no specifically written
constitution. Privacy is protected primarily through
the Human Rights Act 1998, which makes the rights
in the ECHRenforceable underUK law, includingAr-
ticle 8. TheDPDwas transposed intoUK law through
the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA 1998). The E-Pri-
vacy Directive, and subsequently the Cookies Direc-
tive, have also been incorporated into UK law
through the Privacy and Electronic Communications
(EC Directive) Regulations 2003 (PECR) and the Pri-
vacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive)
(Amendment) Regulations 2011 respectively.
In the United States, privacy rights protecting
against governmental actions are provided for at the
constitutional level, eg, in the First Amendment’s
right to anonymous speech; and, in the criminal law
context, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments: the
Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreason-
able searches and seizures which may include a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy analysis, or the Fifth
Amendment’s right to remain silent. Also, the
Supreme Court has suggested that informational pri-
vacy rights may fall within the substantive due
process protections of the US Constitution for gov-
ernmental infringements.39
Data privacy laws can be enacted at the federal or
at the state level. There are multiple federal statuto-
ry provisions protecting personal data that may also
apply to profiling. Medical and health data are pro-
tected under laws such as theHealth Insurance Porta-
bility andAccountability Act (HIPAA) and theGenet-
ic Information Non-discrimination Act. Financial
and commercial data are protected under statutes
such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act and statutes
criminalising identity theft.
As a consumer protection matter, data privacy
matters have increasingly fallen within the jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). For ex-
ample, section 5(a) of the FTC Act provides that ‘un-
fair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com-
merce ... are ... declared unlawful’. The US Safe Web
Act amended the definition in section 5(a) of ‘unfair
or deceptive acts or practices’ to include ‘such acts or
practices involving foreign commerce that cause or
are likely to cause reasonably foreseeable injurywith-
in theUSor involvematerial conduct occurringwith-
in the United States’.
Australia is a signatory to a number of internation-
al instruments which enshrine the protection of the
right to private life, including the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights40. Yet, Aus-
tralia does not have a Bill of Rights protecting fun-
37 Vincent Mazeaud, Les Nouveaux Cahiers du Conseil constitution-
nel 3/2015 (N° 48) 5 et seqq. An explicit constitutionalisation of
privacy came through the caselaw of the Conseil Constitutionnel
from 1995.
38 Loi N°2016-1321 du 7 octobre 2016 pour une République
numérique JORF n°0235 du 8 octobre 2016.
39 See, eg, Whalen v Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
40 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS
171.
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damental rights domestically and therefore also lacks
a constitutional right to privacy. The legal protection
of privacy and personal information in Australian
law remains piece‐meal and incomplete. Informa-
tion privacy is protected through statute law, in par-
ticular the federal Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) and equiv-
alents in the majority of Australian states and terri-
tories. The Privacy Act 1988 adopts a principles‐
based, rather than a prescriptive, approach to data
protection. It contains 13 Australian Privacy Princi-
ples (APPs), which govern the collection, use, disclo-
sure and storage of personal and sensitive informa-
tion, and how individuals may access and correct
records containing such information. The APPs ap-
ply to most Commonwealth government agencies
and large private sector organisations (the so‐called
‘APP entities’).
There is no right to privacy in Australian common
law. To close this gap, the Australian Law Reform
Commission (ALRC) has repeatedly, but so far un-
successfully, recommended the introduction of a
statutory cause of action to protect privacy.41 Under
current law, civil claims for breach of privacy are on-
ly available if, and as far as, other civil causes of ac-
tion coincidentally cover conduct that affects priva-
cy.42
The BrazilianConstitution acknowledges the invi-
olability of private life and also the secrecy of tele-
phonic, telegraphic and data communications. Fur-
thermore, it provides for the writ of habeas data,
which gives citizens a means to access and correct
data about themselves held by third parties.
Despite the existence of a constitutional guaran-
tee of privacy as well as other laws on the use of per-
sonal data, a general law on data protection does not
exist. However, currently there are three legislative
initiatives in theNational Congresswhich aim to reg-
ulate, comprehensively, personal data protection:
Draft Bill no 4060/2012 of the Chamber of Deputies
(House of Representatives); Draft Bill no 330/2013 of
the Senate, and Draft Bill no 5276/2016 of the Presi-
dency of the Republic. Moreover, the Civil Code, the
Consumer Protection Code and, more recently, the
Civil Rights Framework of the Internet (or Internet
Act, Law no 12.965 of 2014) have regulated the pro-
tection of personal data more specifically.
Since the entering into force of the Internet Act,
Brazil disposes of an advanced legal framework
which establishes principles, rights and obligations
for the use of the Internet. A substantial portion of
the Act deals with privacy and data protection. Arti-
cle 7 Internet Act provides rights and guarantees for
internet users. Among them, Article 7 subsections I,
II, III, VII and VIII guarantee the inviolability of pri-
vacy and intimacy, the inviolability and secrecy of all
internet communication and private information
which can be lifted only on behalf of a judicial war-
rant. Furthermore, they guarantee that personal da-
tawill not be supplied to thirdparties, saveupon free,
expressed and informed consent, as well as the right
to clear and complete information about the collec-
tion, usage, storage, processing andprotection of per-
sonal data, which can only be used if the collection
is justified, not prohibited by law and if so specified
in the terms of service or in internet application con-
tracts. Besides this, in Article 7 subsections X and
XIII, the Statute guarantees a right to erasure of per-
sonal data provided by the internet user after the ter-
mination of the legal relationship between parties
and foresees the application of consumer protection
rules to the consumer relations in the internet do-
main.
2. The Absence of a Legal Definition of
Profiling
While the aforementioned 2010 Council of Europe
Recommendation on Profiling defines profiling, this
instrument is not legally binding on Member States.
It defines profiling as an automatic data processing
technique that consists of applying a ‘profile’ to an
individual, particularly inorder to takedecisions con-
cerning her or him or for analysing or predicting her
or his personal preferences, behaviours and atti-
tudes.43
In Germany, no legal definition of profiling has
been established to date. § 6a(1) BDSG, transposing
Article 15 of theDPDconcerning automateddecision-
making, mentions ‘personal aspects’ as a component
of a profile, but not the profile itself. § 15(3)1 TMG
41 Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information:
Australian Privacy Law and Practice (ALRC Report 108, 2008),
Recommendations 74-1–74-7; Australian Law Reform Commis-
sion, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era (ALRC Report
123, 2014).
42 ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 63, (2001) 208
CLR 199.
43 Council of Europe (n 24) app 1(e).
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uses the phrase ‘usage profile’, characterised in legal
commentary variously as ‘a data record giving a part-
image of a personality’44 or, less strictly, ‘any kind of
systematically compiled usage data containing infor-
mation about the behaviour and habits of a user’45.
Legal scholarship has offered a variety of definitions
for profiling46 without one having been established
as the leading one. Scoring for credit purposes, as a
special kind of profiling, is subject to a specific pro-
vision, § 28b BDSG.
There is also no specific definition of profiling in
French law. Nevertheless, there is a legal framework
regarding profiling, defined by two laws. The first
one is Article 10 of the 1978 Act which is a transpo-
sition of Article 15 of the DPD adopted in 2004. The
second one is Article L.581-9 Environmental Code
which requires prior approval by theCommission na-
tionale de l'informatique et des libertés (CNIL), the
French data protection regulator, of any system
which automaticallymeasures the audience of adver-
tising devices in a public space (such as billboards)
or analyses the typology or behaviour of individuals
passing by such devices. In addition, there is a rec-
ommendation by the CNIL of 16 December 2013 re-
garding the use of cookies.
Though the DPA 1998 and PECR provide the
framework in which profiling would be covered,
there is no official definition of profiling in the UK,
and there has not been a significant debate over it.
There are, however, specific provisions in the DPA
governing ‘automated decision-taking’, not directly
covering the creation of profiling data, but potential-
ly governing the use of that data if used automatical-
ly.47
In the US, data profiling is a term that appears to
be related to data analytics - eg, a tool to providemet-
rics and assess data quality, such as whether metada-
ta is accurately descriptive. In the data privacy con-
text of consumer protection, many discuss concerns
surrounding the work of data brokers which the FTC
has defined as ‘companies that collect information,
including personal information about consumers,
from a wide variety of sources for the purpose of re-
selling such information to their customers for vari-
ous purposes, including verifying an individual’s
identity, differentiating records,marketing products,
and preventing financial fraud’.
TheFTChas recommended toCongress that it con-
sider the enactment of legislation to increase the
transparency of consumer profiling by data brokers
and to give consumers the ability to exercise more
control over data collection and use by corporate en-
tities. In 2016, another federal agency, the Federal
Communications Commission, released newprivacy
regulations that now require broadband companies
to seek subscriber permission to collect and use da-
ta on web browsing, app use, and on geolocational
and financial information.
There is no statutory or otherwise official defini-
tion, or specific regulation, of profiling in Australia
or Brazil, and no significant debate over it aside from
somescholarlydiscussions.Generally, profiling isun-
derstood as profile creation, or as the act of automat-
ed collection and processing of information about
users, with the intention of building presumptions
about their personalities and, therefore, predicting
future behaviour.
3. The Concept of Personal Data
Data protection laws only apply to the extent that
‘personal data’ are collected, processed or otherwise
handled. Asmentioned in the introduction, profiling
consists of several steps, not all of which need to in-
volve personal data. For example, when profiling in-
cludes an assessment, recombination and evaluation
of anonymised or statistical data with no reference
to any individual, data protection laws do not apply
to these processes. Once personal data are collected,
processed or stored in order to create a profile of an
individual, data protection laws will become applic-
44 Representing many others Silke Jandt and Philip Laue, ‘Vorausset-
zungen und Grenzen der Profilbildung bei Location Based Ser-
vices‘ [2006] K & R 316, 317.
45 Stephan Bauer, ‘Personalisierte Werbung auf Social Community-
Websites’ [2008] MMR 435, 437; Kerstin Zscherpe in Jürgen
Taeger and Detlev Gabe (eds), BDSG und Datenschutzvorschriften
des TKG und TMG (2nd edn, R&W 2013) § 15 TMG, para 58.
46 Eg Peter Schaar, ‘Persönlichkeitsprofile im Internet’ [2001] DuD
383, 385 et seq; Heike Rasmussen, ‘Datenschutz im Internet’
[2002] CR 36, 38; Bruno Baeriswyl, ‘Data Mining und Data
Warehousing: Kundendaten als Ware oder geschütztes Gut?’
[2000] RDV 6, 7; Petra Wittig, ‘Die datenschutzrechtliche Prob-
lematik der Anfertigung von Persönlichkeitsprofilen zu Market-
ingzwecken’ [2000] RDV 59; Philip Scholz in Spiros Simitis (ed),
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (8th edn, Nomos 2014) § 6a, para 22;
Jandt and Laue (n 44) 316, 318.
47 Data Protection Act 1998 (UK) s 12; see also Information Com-
missioner’s Office, Guide to data protection, Principle 6 – rights
<https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/
principle-6-rights/automated-decision-taking/> accessed 11 No-
vember 2016.
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able. Despite the centrality of ‘personal data’ to the
application of data protection laws, the concept re-
mains contentious, even within the EU.
The DPD of the EU defines personal data as ‘any
information relating to an identified or identifiable
natural person; an identifiable person is onewho can
be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by
reference to an identification number or to one or
more factors specific to his physical, physiological,
economic, cultural or social identity’, Article 2(a). The
definition under the GDPR remains largely un-
changed but contains some clarifications, because it
explicitly includes location data, online identifiers
and genetic identity as further potential identifiers.
Thus, under the definition in Article 4(1) GDPR, per-
sonal data is ‘any information relating to an identi-
fied or identifiable natural person; an identifiable […]
person is one who can be identified, directly or indi-
rectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such
as a name, an identification number, location data,
an online identifier or to one or more factors specif-
ic to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, eco-
nomic, cultural or social identity’. The Court of Jus-
tice of the EU (CJEU) recently clarified that an objec-
tive approach (meaning that it suffices for the con-
struction of personal information if a person can be
identified by means available to anyone) should be
followed to determine identifiability.48 Special cate-
gories of personal data are subject to additional pro-
tections under Article 9 GDPR, covering data relat-
ing to racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, reli-
gious or philosophical beliefs, trade union member-
ship, health, sex life or sexual orientation.
In Germany, the BDSG defines personal data in §
3(1) BDSG as any ‘particulars concerning the person-
al or material circumstances of an identified or iden-
tifiable person’; themajor contrast to the DPD/GDPR
being the reference to ‘particulars’. Therefore, it is
sometimes doubted whether group and statistical in-
formation attached to a single person can be consid-
ered to be personal information. The definition of
special categories of personal data in § 3(9) BDSG is
identical to the DPD. In regard to a subjective or ob-
jective approach to determining identifiability, regu-
lators and DPAs usually follow the objective ap-
proach,49 so eg cookies are considered to generally
process personal data.50 The discussion over it, lead-
ing to the recent CJEU judgment on dynamic IP ad-
dresses, should now end; special data is highly pro-
tected. Non-personal data is in general only protect-
ed if copyright law is applicable or if the data is con-
sidered to be a business secret.51
In France, the 1978 Act originally only referred to
‘nominative information’, which was narrower than
the term ‘personal data’ later introduced by the DPD.
The current definition of ‘personal data’ in Article 2
of the 1978 Act is very similar to the wording of the
DPDandbasedonacomprehensiveapproachof iden-
tifiability. Personal data means any information re-
lating to a natural person who is or can be identified,
directly or indirectly. The only difference is that Ar-
ticle 2 provides that in order to determine whether a
person is identifiable, all themeans that the data con-
troller or any other person uses or may have access
to, should be taken into consideration. TheDPDmen-
tions in recital 26 that only ‘all the means likely rea-
sonably to be used’ by these should be taken in ac-
count. The French definition of personal data is
broader than the one of the DPD because it includes
all the cases where a re-identification of the person
is possible. Furthermore, this broad definition em-
braces the nominative identity (names but also ge-
netic and biometric features etc) and the virtual or
digital identity of the person such as anypseudonym,
avatar, logging code, cookies or IP addresses.52 Final-
ly, Article 8 includes a specific regime for sensitive
data.
In theUK, the definition of personal data is intend-
ed to follow that in the DPD, but the case of Durant53
narrowed the interpretation, suggesting that person-
48 Case C-582/14 Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [CJEU,
2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:779 paras 39, 43, 46.
49 See Düsseldorfer Kreis, Ausgestaltung von Analyseverfahren zur
Reichweitenmessung bei Internet-Angeboten (decision from
26/27 November 2009); Thomas Dreier and Indra Spiecker
genannt Doehmann, Die systematische Aufnahme des Straßen-
bildes – zur rechtlichen Zulässigkeit von Online-Diensten wie
"Google Street View" (Nomos 2010) 67 et seqq; Matthias Bergt,
‘Die Bestimmbarkeit als Grundproblem des Datenschutzrechts’
[2015] ZD 368.
50 Ulrich Dammann in Spiros Simitis (ed), Bundesdatenschutzgesetz
(8th edn, Nomos 2014) § 3, para 65; Peter Schaar, Datenschutz
im Internet (Beck 2002) paras 177 et seqq, 186; Johann Bizer,
‘Web-Cookies – datenschutzrechtlich’ [1998] DuD 277, 280.
51 See BVerwG,case 6 B 59/04 [2005] in [2005] CR, 194, 195;
BVerfG, cases 1 BvR 2087/03, 1 BvR 2111/03 [2006] in [2006]
NVwZ 1041, 1042; BGH, case VI ZR 156/13 [2014] in [2014]
NJW 2014, 1235, 1237; also regulated explicitly in several
regulations.
52 Anne Debet, Jean Massot and Nathalie Metallinos, Informatique
et libertés, la protection à caractère données personnelles en droit
français et européen (Lextenso 2015) 248.
53 Durant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746.
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al data ‘should have the putative data subject as its
focus’ and referred to ‘biographical significance’,
meaning ‘information that affects [a person’s] priva-
cy, whether in his personal or family life, business or
professional capacity’.
The courts in the UK have subsequently been
broadening the definition again, bringing it closer
to the definition in the DPD. In the case of Edem,54
the Court of Appeal noted that the contentious re-
quirement in Durant should only apply in ‘border-
line’ cases.55 The court specifically endorsed the
guidance of the UK Information Commissioner
(ICO) over what constitutes personal data, a guid-
ance that alignsmuch closer with the wording of the
Directive.56
As the UK considers its future approach to data
protection in the light of Brexit, it is possible that
the historical attitude to the definition of personal
data is retrenched. Whether cookies are considered
personal data is contextual: the ICO notes that
though the PECR apply to all cookies, the DPA ap-
plies only to cookies that ‘process personal data’, im-
plying that ‘anonymised’ cookie data do not consti-
tute personal data,57whilewhether IP addresses con-
stitute personal data under UK law remains uncer-
tain.
In the US, the concept of Personally identifiable
information (PII) is defined as:
[A]ny information about an individualmaintained
by an agency, including (1) any information that
can be used to distinguish or trace an individual‘s
identity, such as name, social security number,
date and place of birth, mother‘s maiden name, or
biometric records; and (2) any other information
that is linked or linkable to an individual, such as
medical, educational, financial, and employment
information.58
In recent years, Congress has not passed federal leg-
islation expressly defining the legal scope of ‘person-
al data’ despite increased efforts for a more encom-
passing definition. The Obama Administration pro-
mulgated efforts to coordinate a data privacy legisla-
tive reform in the ‘Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights’.
In the White House ‘Discussion Draft of the Con-
sumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015’, for exam-
ple, personal data is defined as any data that are un-
der the control of a covered entity, not otherwise gen-
erally available to the public through lawful means,
and are linked, or, as a practical matter, linkable by
the covered entity, to a specific individual. Interest-
ingly, sufficient is also the link to a device that is as-
sociated with or routinely used by an individual. In
that sense, personal data can be, eg, (among others)
the name, address, telephone/social security/pass-
port/driver’s licencenumber, biometric identifier (eg
fingerprint) or any unique persistent identifier, in-
cluding an alphanumeric string that uniquely iden-
tifies a networked device, financial account number,
health care account number or any required securi-
ty code, access code, or password that is necessary
to access an individual’s service account. Also,
unique identifiers or other descriptive information
about personal computing or communication de-
vices are included in the list. Moreover, any data that
are collected, created, processed, used, disclosed,
stored, or otherwise maintained and linkable, are
mentioned.
Australia uses the concept of ‘personal informa-
tion’. Since 2014, the Privacy Act 1988 defines ‘per-
sonal information’ in section 6 as ‘[…] information or
opinion about an identified individual, or an individ-
ual who is reasonably identifiable:
(a) whether the information or opinion is true or
not; and
(b) whether the information or opinion is record-
ed in material form or not’.59
Unlike the Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development (OECD) Guidelines, which de-
fine personal data as ‘information relating to an iden-
54 Edem v IC & Financial Services Authority [2014] EWCA Civ 92.
55 ‘Roll out the bunting: Durant judgment is good as dead and
buried’ (Amberhawk, 19 February 2014) <http://amberhawk
.typepad.com/amberhawk/2014/02/roll-out-the-bunting-durant
-judgment-is-good-as-dead-and-buried.html> accessed 11 No-
vember 2016.
56 Information Commissioner’s Office, Guide to data protection, Key
definitions https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-pro-
tection/key-definitions/ accessed 11 November 2016.
57 See Information Commissioner’s Office, Guide to Privacy and
Electronic Communications Regulations <https://ico.org.uk/for
-organisations/guide-to-pecr/cookies-and-similar-technologies/>
accessed 11 November 2016.
58 US National Institute of Standards and Technology, US Depart-
ment of Commerce, Guide to Protecting the Confidentiality of
Personally Identifiable Information (PII), Special Publication
800-122 (April 2010) <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/
nistspecialpublication800-122.pdf> accessed 11 November 2016.
59 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 6(1). ‘Sensitive information’ is given
greater protection under the APPs than other information. Sensi-
tive information includes information about a person’s racial or
ethnic origin; political opinions; religious or philosophical beliefs;
sexual orientation as well as health, genetic or biometric informa-
tion.
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tified or identifiable individual’,60 the Australian de-
finition refers to information ‘about’ an individual.
It has been suggested that thismaymake a difference
in caseswhere information has only tenuous connec-
tion with an individual, in particular where informa-
tion identifies a device rather than an individual.61
This is illustrated by the ongoing so-called Grubb
litigation, in which the Administrative Appeals Tri-
bunal (AAT) held that the words ‘about an individ-
ual’ in the definition of personal information raised
a threshold question that needs to be addressed be-
fore the determination whether that individual is
identified or identifiable. AAT Deputy President
Forgie decided that mobile phone service metadata
was information about a service, not about an indi-
vidual62 – notwithstanding the fact that the individ-
ual who obtained the service was ascertainable from
this information. Similarly, it was held that a dynam-
ic IP address is not information about an individual
because ‘the connection between the person using a
mobile device and an IP address is … ephemeral’.63
The contentious decision that suchmetadatawas not
personal information is currently under appeal. The
decision of Full Court of the Federal Court is highly
anticipated because it will provide the first interpre-
tation by an appellate court of the Australian defin-
ition of ‘personal information’. The exact scope of
that termwill be of critical importance in caseswhere
information can be linked to an individual only
through indirect means, such as the interrogation of,
and matching across, multiple databases. The Grubb
litigation has evident relevance also for tracking of
individuals through their use of electronic devices.
To the extent that cookie technology only ascertains
IP addresses rather than a person, it remains current-
ly doubtful in Australia whether the information col-
lected and stored is personal information.64
InBrazil, the concept of personal data is expressed
in the Draft Bills, and is defined as: any information
relating to an identified or identifiable individual, di-
rectly or indirectly, including every address or iden-
tification number of a terminal used for connection
to a computer network. The recent Decree no
8,771/2016, which regulates the Civil Rights Frame-
work of the Internet, defines personal data, in item
I of Article 14, as data related to identified or identi-
fiable natural persons, including identifying num-
bers, electronic identifiers or locational data when
they are related to a person. Three types of data can
be the object of analysis: (1) General Personal Data –
data related to an identified or identifiable natural
person, electronic identifiers or locational data, ie
birth dates, addresses, passwords, profile descrip-
tions, etc; (2) Sensitive Data – personal data reveal-
ing racial or ethnic origin, religious, philosophical or
moral convictions; data concerning the health or sex
life, as well as genetic data; and (3) non-personal da-
ta – data relating to a data subject that cannot be iden-
tified, either by the controller or by any other per-
son, taking into account the number of susceptible
means reasonably to be used to identify the data sub-
ject.
4. Consent and Other Legitimate
Grounds for Profiling
According to European standards under the DPD, de-
cision-making based solely on automated processing
of personal data is in general forbidden, but it is law-
ful when based on consent or another specified
ground. This will remain intact under the GDPR.
In Germany, the requirements of lawful data pro-
cessing differ, depending on whether the profiling is
done by the data processor for his or her own com-
mercial purposes (§ 28 BDSG) or whether it is done
for the commercial purpose of transferring the re-
sults to a third person (§ 29 BDSG). Both provisions
require a balancing of interests. The DPAs agree that
advanced user profiles beyond the individual con-
tractneed tobepseudonymised.65Under§28bBDSG,
businesses are allowed to generate and use a statisti-
cal value on a person’s future behaviour for the es-
tablishment, execution or termination of a contrac-
tual relationship. This scoring method may be used
on a mathematic-statistical basis only, but not for
past-related evaluation of data, hence prohibiting the
60 OECD, Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder
Flows of Personal Data (2013) pt I 1b).
61 Eg Mark Burdon and Alissa McKillop, ‘The Google Street View
Wi-Fi Scandal and its Repercussions for Privacy Regulation’
(2013) 39 Monash University Law Review 702, 712.
62 Telstra Corporation Limited and Privacy Commissioner [2015]
AATA 991, 112.
63 ibid 113.
64 Robert Slattery and Marilyn Krawitz, ‘Mark Zuckerberg, the
Cookie Monster – Australian Privacy Law and Internet Cookies’
(2014) 16 Flinders Law Journal 1, 16.
65 Düsseldorfer Kreis, Ausgestaltung von Analyseverfahren zur
Reichweitenmessung bei Internet-Angeboten (decision from
26./27 November 2009).
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generation of personal profiles,66which are conduct-
ed by algorithm analysis.
By collecting and creating more data than neces-
sary for the individual purpose, profiling often con-
flicts with the principles of necessity and data scarci-
ty and alsowith the principle of appropriation as pro-
filing is executed to find new scopes for existing da-
ta and create meta-data. The balancing test therefore
regularly comes down in favour of the legitimate in-
terest of the data subject.67 This applies all the more
as the legitimate interest of a data subject of not be-
ing profiled increases as more data about him or her
is compiled.68 The Cologne Civil Court of Appeals
ruled that a company did not have the right to estab-
lish profiles comparing former customers under § 28
BDSG.69
A comprehensive personal profile is seen as the
upper limit of what data collection and processing
are allowed to create. Uncontrolled compilation of
personal data, indexing the personality of a human
being and making him or her the pure object of in-
formation, is inconsistent with the German constitu-
tion70 and also, considering the data retention deci-
sion of the CJEU,71 with European law.
As informed consent under § 4a BDSG is bound
by its purpose, profiling can be based on consent on-
ly if the purposes of the profiling are specified be-
fore the processing. However, undefined profiling or
a general profiling for any not pre-determined pur-
pose is not permissible.
In the French legal context, there is no real prohi-
bition of profiling but rather specific conditions for
allowing it. First, the collection of the data for a pro-
filing use must adhere to the main principles of the
1978 Act: fair and lawful processing (Article 6 § 1) for
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and only
for those purposes (Article 6 § 2). The processing has
to be based on legitimate grounds (Article 7), consent
of the data subject being one of them. The pursuit of
the data controller’s legitimate interest is also fre-
quently invoked. Most of the time, a balancing of in-
terest has to be done.
Secondly, specific requirements must be met for
the collection and the processing of special data. Ar-
ticle 8 provides ten possibilities for profiling of sen-
sitive data. Sensitive data may be profiled with the
explicit consent of the data subject or if the data sub-
ject himself or herself disclosed these sensitive data,
except if a law prohibits it.72 French law also impos-
es an obligation to obtain authorisation by the CNIL
before the implementation of such processing.73
In the UK, the legal limits are those governing da-
ta in general. The UK government and the ICO gave
support to an internet-based profiling and advertis-
ing business that intercepted an ISP subscriber’sweb
traffic andbuilt up aprofile of the subscriber for com-
mercial reasons claiming to apply an ‘anonymisation’
technique.74 In another case, the ICO found an app
that analysed people’s tweets to assess whether they
were in a vulnerable mental state to be in breach of
the rules concerning sensitive personal data. The ICO
made it clear that data protection rules apply even
on public data from the public tweets.75
In theUS, notice and consent requirements are en-
couragedby theFTC’s Fair InformationPractice Prin-
ciples (FIPPs):76
66 Kai von Lewinski in Heinrich Wolff and Stefan Brink (eds), Daten-
schutzrecht in Bund und Ländern (Beck 2013) § 28b, para 1;
Peter Gola and Rudolf Schomerus, BDSG: Bundesdatenschutzge-
setz Kommentar (12th edn, Beck 2015) § 28b, para 6.
67 Spiros Simitis in Spiros Simitis (ed), Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (8th
edn, Nomos 2014) § 28, para 138 et seqq; Thomas Paefgen,
‘Datenbankmanagement als Führungsinstrument’ [1994] CR 65 et
seqq; Astrid Breinlinger, ‘Datenschutzrechtliche Probleme bei
Kunden- und Verbraucherbefragungen’ [1997] RDV 249 et
seqq; Thilo Weichert, ‘Datenschutzrechtliche Probleme beim
Adresshandel’ [1996] WRP 522, 527.
68 See Jürgen Taeger, ‘Datenschutz im Versandhandel’ [2007] BB
785, 789 et seq.
69 OLG Köln, case I-6 U 70/09 [2010] in [2010] NJW 90.
70 BVerfG cases 1 BvR 209/83 and others [1983] in BVerfGE 65, 1,
48; BVerfG case 1 BvL 19/63 [1969] in BVerfGE 27, 1, 6.
71 Digital Rights Ireland (n 27) and Kärntener Landesregierung (n 27)
paras 27 et seqq, 32 et seqq, 52 et seqq.
72 See art 1111-8 of the Code of Public Health which prohibits paid
transactions of personal health data even with the consent of the
data subject. However, a lot of profiling processing due to con-
nected objects or smartphone applications should not be covered
by this exemption.
73 See art L. 581-9 of the Environmental Code requires prior ap-
proval by the CNIL of any system which automatically measures
of the audience on an advertising device in a public space (such
as billboards) or analyses the typology or behaviour of individuals
passing by such devices.
74 See eg Paul Bernal, ‘Rise and Phall: Lessons from the Phorm
Saga’ in Serge Gutwirth et al (eds), Computers, Privacy and
Data Protection: An element of choice (Springer 2011).
75 Information Rights and Wrongs (Blog), ‘ICO: Samaritans Radar
failed to comply with Data Protection Act’ (Information Rights
and Wrongs, 25 April 2015) <https://informationrightsandwrongs
.com/2015/04/25/ico-samaritans-radar-failed-to-comply-with-data
-protection-act/> accessed 11 November 2016.
76 Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: A Report to Congress
(June 1998) <https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
reports/privacy-online-report-congress/priv-23a.pdf> accessed 15
December 2016.
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1. Notice/Awareness (to the individual about infor-
mation collected,maintained and used by the entity);
2. Choice and Consent (on the part of the individ-
ual about that information, including whether it is
collected in the first instance and how and under
what circumstances it is disclosed to third parties);
3. Access/Participation (whether the individual
has access to that information and the ability to cor-
rect any mistakes);
4. Integrity/Security (the administrative, technical
and physical safeguards of the information, includ-
ing notice if the information is leaked);
5. Enforcement/Redress (legal, policy, contractual
or ethical).
The FIPPs are understood to be conceptual guide-
lines, not laws.77 The adherence relies upon corpo-
rate self-regulation. In the US, no federal statute pro-
vides consumers with the right to learn what infor-
mation data brokers have compiled about them, nor
provides a requirement of consent or ‘opt out’ op-
tions to prevent data brokers from collecting, shar-
ing or publishing their personal information.
Profiling in Australia is subject to the general da-
ta processing regime under the Privacy Act 1988
(Cth). As stated above, the APPs only apply to the
handling of personal information, so profiling on the
basis of de-identified information is not regulated in
the Privacy Act.
Consent is a critical concept underlying a number
of the APPs. It can provide an exception from a gen-
eral prohibition of handling data in a particular way.
For example, under APP 3.3, an APP entity can col-
lect sensitive information about an individual only
with that person’s consent. Under APP 6.1, an APP
entity must not use personal information for a sec-
ondary purpose (ie a purpose other than the partic-
ular purpose for which the data was collected) unless
the individual consents (or an exception applies).
Part IIIA of the Privacy Act 1988 sets out the types
of personal information that credit providers and
credit reporting bodies are permitted to collect about
an individual for the purpose of inclusion in that in-
dividual’s credit report. That part also provides safe-
guards in relation to the handling of that informa-
tion, includingwho is permitted to access an individ-
ual’s credit report and for what purposes.
There is also a self-regulatory guideline for third
party online behavioural advertising (OBA), devel-
oped by the online advertising sector. The Guideline
states that no ‘[p]ersonal information is collected or
used for OBA’ and distinguishes OBA from customer
profile advertising (which is based on the personal
information of an individual user). Also, third party
OBA is subject to seven self-regulatory principles,
among them that third parties who want to combine
OBA data with personal information must treat the
OBA data as if it is personal information and in ac-
cordance with the Privacy Act. Other principles in-
clude a requirement to provide clear information to
users, to give users choice over the collection of data
for OBA, to keep data for no longer than necessary
and to seek explicit consent for sensitive market seg-
ments.
In different situations, the Brazilian legal system
protects the individual by imposing a requirement
of prior consent for numerous acts of civil life. In the
digital context, the Civil Rights Framework to the In-
ternet in item IX of Article 7 assigns rights to the da-
ta subject, among these the clear manifestation of
consent for operations concerning his/her personal
data.
Law no 12.414/2011 (Credit Report Act) grants the
consumer power over the creation, transfer and can-
cellation of his/her credit history. Consumer consent
is, hence, the touchstone of this framework, as pro-
vided by Article 4. Furthermore, according to Article
5, consumers may obtain the cancellation of the
record upon request and, as determined by Article 9,
the sharing of information is permitted only if ex-
pressly authorised by the consumer.
5. The Challenges of Transparency,
Remedies and Enforcement
Transparency, ie the obligation on data controllers to
be open and honest about their data handling prac-
tices, is an important aim of data protection laws.
Under the DPD of the EU, the general rights of da-
ta subjects alsoapply in thecontextofprofiling.Thus,
the data subject may request information about
stored data, may require erasure or correction and,
if rights were violated, may in general claim dam-
ages. The DPAs are entitled to control whether the
law was obeyed and may enact sanctions. In several
judgments, the CJEU has strengthened the position
77 Robert Gellman, Fair Information Practices: A Brief History (rev.
June 17, 2016) <http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPShistory.pdf
> accessed 15 December 2016.
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and independence of DPAs also vis-à-vis the Euro-
pean Commission.78 Under the GDPR, the DPAs are
required to make use of a consistency procedure in
cross-border cases; the fines for violations have been
raised, but other than that, the general structure of
remedies remains unchanged.
In Germany, the provider of Internet services is
subject to stricter data protection duties than a data
processor under general data protection law. Under
§ 13 (1) 1 TMG, the data subject is to be notified about
the character, extent and purpose of the collection
and use of his or her personal data.79 For automated
processing that enables the later identification of
users and prepares the collection of personal data, §
13 (1) 2 TMG also establishes a prior duty to inform
the data subject.80The declaration of consent and the
notification have to be executed separately from the
other information and declarations [§ 13 (2) TMG]
and can be done electronically. As illegal profiling in-
fringes a person’s right on informational self-deter-
mination, the data subject can apply for an injunc-
tion81 and also for damages, according to § 823 (1 and
2) Civil Code (BGB) and § 7 BDSG. However, as Ger-
man law only exceptionally grants damages for non-
pecuniary losses arising from injury of personality
rights, these monetary remedies are often fruitless.
In case of automated decision-making, the data
subject may also claim information about the tech-
nology behind the decision, ie the algorithms and the
data; however, the Bundesgerichtshof, the highest
German Civil Court, has restricted access in credit-
scoring cases due to prevailing interests of the scor-
ing company.82
In France, the right to be informed (Article 32 of
the 1978 Act), the right to object (Article 38) and the
right to access and to rectification (Article 39) can be
used by the data subject in the context of profiling.
In the UK, advice and support is provided by the
ICO. Due to restraints in resources, in practice, data
subjects rely on civil society or pro-active lawyers and
other groups to both discover that they have been il-
legallyprofiledand to learnaboutpotential remedies.
In the US, the FTC has released a report in May
2014 calling for greater transparency and account-
ability measures in regulating data brokers. In the
corporate context, commercial databases are increas-
ingly subjected to a regulatory framework that falls
within Section 5 enforcement of the FTC.
Consumers in the US generally have no federal
right to know what information data brokers have
compiled about them. According to the FTC, no cur-
rent federal laws require data brokers to maintain
consumer data privacy unless the data is used for
credit, employment, insurance, housing, or other re-
lated purposes. Also, no federal law provides con-
sumers with the right to correct inaccuracies in the
data. However, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)
regulates consumer reporting agencies (CRAs),
which are entities that assemble consumer data into
consumer reports (credit reports) for credit scoring
systems. The FCRA applies to data brokers if the da-
ta is used by issuers of credits or insurances, or by
employers, landlords, and others in making eligibil-
ity decisions affecting consumers. Several experts
have recently called for greater regulation of data
mining, including regulation of government data
mining and regulation of private data brokers.
Enforcement of data privacy laws and promulga-
tion of federal data privacy regulation can be accom-
plished through agencies; many federal agencies
have created a Privacy Officer. On the private sector
side, consumers may file a complaint with the FTC,
for example. However, the jurisdiction is limited to
what congressional statutes may have been enacted
to support the agency’s enforcement activities.
Under constitutional provisions, citizens can at-
tempt to vindicate constitutional rights in federal
court. For example, in theNoFlyList litigation,which
remains active, the plaintiffs have asserted both pro-
cedural due process and substantive due process vi-
olations.83
In Australia, the declared object of APP 1 is ‘to en-
sure that entitiesmanage personal information in an
open and transparentway’. This includes that anAPP
78 Case C-518/07 Commission v Germany [CJEU, 2008]
ECLI:EU:C:2010:125 paras 24 et seq; Case C-614/10 Commission
v Austria [CJEU, 2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:631 para 42 et seqq; Case
C-230/14 Weltimmo v Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információsz-
abadság Hatóság [CJEU, 2014] ECLI:EU:C:2015:639 paras 19 et
seqq; Indra Spiecker gen. Döhmann, ‘Anmerkung zu EuGH Rs.
C-518/07 – Unabhängigkeit der Datenschutz-Aufsichtsbehörden
im nicht-öffentlichen Bereich’ [2010] JZ 787 et seqq with further
references.
79 Flemming Moos in Jürgen Taeger and Detlev Gabel, BDSG und
Datenschutzvorschriften des TKG und TMG (2nd edn, R&W
2013) §13, paras 4, 9.
80 ibid para 10.
81 ibid § 28, para 237.
82 BGH, case VI ZR 156/13 [2014] in [2014] NJW 1235, 1237.
83 See, eg, Latif v Holder 686 F.3d 1122, 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 2012)
(No Fly List litigation by plaintiffs alleging, inter alia, due process
violations).
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entity has a clearly expressed and up-to-date privacy
policy about how it manages personal information
(APP 1.3). APP 5 requires that APP entities take rea-
sonable steps to inform individuals of the fact and
circumstances, as well as the purposes, of the collec-
tion of personal information and to which third par-
ties the information will usually be disclosed. It de-
pends on the circumstances of each case what steps
need to be taken to ensure compliancewith this Prin-
ciple. Under APP 12.1, an APP entity that holds per-
sonal information must on request give the individ-
ual access to the information. The legal remedies
against breaches of privacy are effectively limited to
regulatory responses. A person alleging a breach of
their privacy rights under the Privacy Act 1988 can
complain to the Office of the Australian Information
Commissioner. The Commissioner has traditionally
adopted a ‘light touch’ approach to regulation, under
which most complaints were resolved through con-
ciliation. When the Commissioner makes use of his
power to make a determination, he may require the
respondent to change its practices or to take repara-
tive action, including pay compensation, make an
apology or provide another suitable remedy. As there
is no common law right to privacy, invasions of pri-
vacy are not actionable in civil courts.
In Article 7, VIII, the Brazilian Civil Rights Frame-
work of the Internet approaches transparency and
purpose. Article 7, VI and VIII establish that privacy
policies or any terms of use applicable to personal
data shall be clear and understandable. The need for
‘clear and comprehensive’ information is a conse-
quence of the adoption of the informed consent
mechanism. All treatments of personal data shall be
known and transparent to the data subject, in their
existence and characteristics.
Like the Consumer Protection Code, the Credit Re-
port Act establishes the rights to the access, rectifica-
tion and cancellation of data (Article 5, II and III).
Furthermore, it grants the consumer access to the
main criteria used in the credit rating process, that
is, the consumer has the right to know the criteria
upon which a calculation of credit risk is based (Ar-
ticle 5, IV).
Data subjects who may wish to know about their
personal data stored at databases may require access
to this information. If denied the same, data subjects
have recourse to a constitutional writ of habeas da-
ta, regulated by Federal Law no 9.507/97. Based on
Article 7, it shall be granted: to ensure knowledge of
information relating to the person of the petitioner
stored at public databases (I) or, for the correction of
data, when the petitioner does not prefer to do so
through confidential, judicial or administrative pro-
ceedings (II).
6. Automated Decision-Making
The EU regulates automated decision-making cur-
rently through the DPD and, in future, through the
GDPR. However, the regulatory effects can be con-
sidered as rather limited so far.84
In Germany, § 6a BDSG prohibits that decisions
with legal or other significant effect are based exclu-
sively on an automated processing of personal data.
Aside from this, the use of profiling is only rarely for-
bidden, eg in health or insurance law for reasons of
consumer protection; a general provision does not
exist.
In France, the ban of automated decision-making
had been originally envisaged in the 1978 Act (Arti-
cles 2 and 3).85 Currently, Article 10 of the 1978 Act
provides that no decision having a legal effect on an
individual may be taken solely on the basis of auto-
matic processing of data intended to define the pro-
file of the data subject or to assess some aspects of
their personality. The Article has a theoretical scope.
It has only be quoted by the CNIL in order to remind
the data controller that he has to proceed to a human
intervention or to give the data subject the opportu-
nity to give his/her point of view. The failure to com-
ply with this obligation is not punishable by law. Un-
derArticle 10 of the 1978Act, theCNIL and the judges
can only provide a review of a decision that involved
a human intervention.
In theUK, there are specific provisions in the DPA
governing ‘automated decision-taking’, not directly
covering the creation of profiling data, but potential-
ly governing the use of that data if the data is
processed automatically. No further regulation exists
aside from the specific area of credit rating which is
regulated mostly by the Consumer Credit Act 1974,
which defines a ‘credit reference agency’ as ‘a person
84 See also above 3.3.
85 The original 1978 Act had opted for a larger material scope
including all administrative or private decision which implies an
appreciation on the human behaviour and not only a decision
having legal effect on individual.
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carrying on a business comprising the furnishing of
persons with information relevant to the financial
standing of individuals, being information collected
by the agency for that purpose.’ Credit reference
agencies (CRAs) are regulated by the Financial Con-
duct Agency (FCA) rather than the ICO, and the cred-
it reports they provide may also legally be used to
‘…verify the identity, age and residency of individu-
als, to identify and track fraud, to combat money
laundering and to help recover payment of debts.’86
The FCA requires CRAs to supply credit rating in-
formation to individuals in a timely manner and at
a low cost, but not the logic or underlying systems
through which ratings are calculated.
In theUS, there are no specific rules or regulations
that govern automated decision-making processes as
a whole. Companiesmay use them in a range of busi-
ness environments, including in credit andmortgage
lending and employment decisions. To the extent
that guidance is provided on automated decision-
making, it would likely be applied pursuant to an al-
ready existing regulatory regime. For instance, the
Fair Credit Report Act of 1970 regulates the collec-
tion, dissemination and use of consumer informa-
tion, including consumer credit information, and
fairness and accuracy in credit decision-making. In
regard to data processing between the EU and the
US, theArticle 29WorkingPartyhas commented that
the new US-EU Privacy Shield does not provide any
guarantees in relation to control of automated deci-
sion-making.87
In Australia, profiling abuses can arise when deci-
sions are made on the basis of unjustifiable profil-
ing, including decisions made on an automatic ba-
sis.88There is currently no specific regulation inAus-
tralia of automated or computer-assisted decision-
making although it is becoming increasingly wide-
spread.89 Anti-discrimination legislation may pro-
vide redress in cases in which decisions are based on
non-permissible grounds such as race, sex or disabil-
ity.
7. The Scarcity of Case Law on Profiling
There is no EU case law on profiling. The data reten-
tion decision of the CJEU, which concerned the col-
lection and use of telecommunications data,90 has
some bearing on profiling because it defined narrow
limits for general and blanket data retention.
In Germany, the Bundesgerichtshof refused to
grant a data subject access under § 34 BDSG to the
calculation method of a credit scoring agency. The
so-called ‘score formula’ was judged to be part of a
company’s protected business secrets; access rights
were limited to information about the data used and
the conclusion.91 The decision has been criticised as
reducing the rights of data subjects too far.92
The Bundesverfassungsgericht, the German Con-
stitutional Court, has ruled several times that over-
reaching profiles by the state are not legitimate un-
der theConstitution,93however, data retention ispos-
sible.94 This ruling also applies indirectly to profil-
ing by private entities.
In France, case law on profiling, as well as data
protection in general, is remarkably scarce. The ma-
jority of decisions relate to the informed consent of
the data subject regarding cookies, usually following
CNIL investigations into the use of cookies in certain
sectors (datingweb sites ornewswebsites) or by com-
panies (Google, Facebook).95 In some cases, the stor-
ing of the data was excessive in time.96 Furthermore,
globalised information service companies such as
Google and Facebook were criticised by the CNIL97
86 Information Commissioner’s Office, For the public: Credit <https://
ico.org.uk/for-the-public/credit/> accessed 11 November 2016.
87 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 'Opinion 01/2016 on
the EU–U.S. Privacy Shield draft adequacy decision' (13 April
2016) 2.1.5, 17-18.
88 Lyria Bennett Moses and Janet Chan, ‘Using Big Data for Legal
and Law Enforcement Decisions: Testing the New Tools’ (2014)
37 University of New South Wales Law Journal 643.
89 The Hon Justice Melissa Perry and Alexander Smith, ‘iDecide: the
Legal Implications of Automated Decision-making’, Speech at the
University of Cambridge, Cambridge Centre for Public Law
Conference 2014: Process and Substance in Public Law, 15-17
September 2014 <http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/digital-law-library/
judges-speeches/justice-perry/perry-j-20140915> accessed 11
November 2016.
90 Digital Rights Ireland (n 27) and Kärntener Landesregierung (n 27)
paras 27 et seqq, 32 et seqq, 52 et seqq.
91 BGH case VI ZR 156/13 [2014] in [2014] NJW 1235, 1237.
92 Ulrich Schulte am Hülse and Markus Timm, ‘Anmerkung zu BGH,
Urt. v. 20.01.2014, VI ZR 156/13’ [2014] in [2014] NJW, 1235,
1239; Christian Kirchberg, ‘Anmerkung zu BGH, Urt. v.
29.01.2014, VI ZR 156/13’ [2014] in [2014] NVwZ 747, 752.
93 BVerfG cases 1 BvR 209/83 and others [1983] in BVerfGE 65, 1,
53; BVerfG case 1 BvL 19/63 [1969] in BVerfGE 27, 1, 6.
94 BVerfG cases 1 BvR 256/08 and others [2010] in BVerfGE 125,
260, 321.
95 Decision 2016-007 of 26 January 2016 in which the CNIL
revealed that the large scope of the surveillance made by Face-
book.
96 See the Deliberation 2013-420 of the CNIL regarding Google
Privacy Policy.
97 ibid.
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for compiling all the information across all of their
services or across Internet users without legal basis.
In its deliberation 2015-255, the CNIL disallowed
the practice of estimating pedestrian flow in a
Parisian district by using information from tracking
the addresses of mobile phones within the reach of
25metres. The decision was based on Article 7 of the
1978 Act and the lack of informed consent. The CNIL
estimated that the data controller’s legitimate inter-
est has to be compatible with the right to be previ-
ously informed of the data subject. The CNIL also
pointed to the lack of proportionality between the
risks of the processing and the guarantees created for
the data subject.
In theUK, due to the general ‘light touch’ approach
of the ICO, many of the key examples in this field
never reach court and ICO’s opinions sometimes
come to public attention only as a result of Freedom
of Information requests.98
One profiling case that did come to court has been
the ‘blacklisting’ system that had been used by ma-
jor construction firms for many years.99 Secretly es-
tablishedprofiles ofworkers onunion activity, health
and safety issues etc. were used to ‘blacklist’ and pre-
vent them from being employed.100 The case was fi-
nally settledoutof court for tensofmillionsofpounds
of damages from the blacklisters;101 the basis, how-
ever,wasbreachof confidence anddefamation rather
than any specific profiling or data protection law.
Other critical cases include Vidal-Hall102 concern-
ing Google’s tracking of people for targeted advertis-
ing overriding the privacy settings in the browser. Ef-
fectively, the court ruled that for the tort of ‘misuse
of private information’103 to apply, and for a breach
of the Data Protection Act in addition to that, there
was no need for pecuniary harm. In other words, the
distress alone of having one’s private information
gathered against one’s wishes was a breach – which
leaves the possibility for profiling itself to be seen as
a breach.
With regard to credit scores, the Brazilian Superi-
or Court of Justice (STJ)104 has recently decided that
this commercial practice is authorised by Article 5,
IV and by Article 7, I of the Credit Report Act. There-
fore, credit score data banks are a lawful commercial
practice. But, data subjects must authorise the inclu-
sion of their information in the database (Article 2,
II), thus making a further consent by the consumer
tomake use of it unnecessary.However, if consumers
request information about the sources of data used,
these shall be provided (Article 2). The violation of
these rights may give rise to liability of the service
provider, the person responsible for the database, the
source and the person or company that made use of
the information (Article 16) for the occurrence of
moral damages in the event of use of excessive infor-
mation or sensitive data (Article 3, § 3, I and II), and
in cases of improper denial of credit using incorrect
or outdated data.105
Especially interesting for profiling studies is the
Oi/Phorm case, investigated and decided by the Na-
tional Consumer Bureau (SENACON) of theMinistry
of Justice. The SENACON issued a fine of $1.6 mil-
lion to one of the country's largest telecommunica-
tions companies (Oi) for invading the privacy of sub-
scribers to its broadband Internet service by tracking
their web usage and offering this data for behaviour-
al advertisement without consent.106
V. Conclusion and Outlook
Profiling is a worldwide practice of analysing infor-
mation and making use of personal data to evaluate
aspects of individual personality and to predict hu-
man behaviour. Big and Smart Data analytics make
this practice potentially more accessible, more reli-
able, and therefore economically more lucrative.
There is a dearth of decided cases, making it diffi-
cult to assess whether the differences in regulatory
approaches have much effect on the actual practice.
Consumer protection rights, telecommunications
98 Eg the Samaritans Radar app, see UK section (n 75) 18.
99 For a detailed discussion of this story, see Dave Smith and Phil
Chamberlain, Blacklisted – the Secret War Between Big Business
and Union Activists (New Internationalist 2015).
100 Information Commissioner’s Office, For the public: Construction
blacklist <https://ico.org.uk/for-the-public/construction-blacklist/>
accessed 11 November 2016.
101 See ‘Construction workers win payouts for “blacklisting”’ (BBC
News, 9 May 2016) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/busi-
ness-36242312 and ‘Vidal-Hall v Google Inc’ (5RB, 16 January
2014) <http://www.5rb.com/case/vidal-hall-ors-v-google-inc/> ac-
cessed 11 November 2016.
102 Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2014] EWHC 13 (QB).
103 As established in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22.
104 The STJ is responsible for the final judgment of civil and criminal
cases not involving constitutional matters thus standardizing the
interpretation of federal law.
105 STJ -Resp. 1419697 RS, Rel. Ministro Paulo de Tarso Sanseverino,
Segunda Seção, julgado em 12/11/2014, DJ 17/11/2014 <http://
zip.net/bxtxbk> accessed 11 November 2016.
106 Phorm is the same company referred to in the UK section (n 74).
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law, data protection frameworks and general priva-
cy rights, to name just a few, all compete with each
other without setting clear standards or providing
clear outcomes. Legal scholarship is only beginning
to address the conflict of interests arising from the
use and economic benefits of commercial profiling,
on the one hand, and its effect on personal dignity,
autonomy and privacy, on the other hand.
While the use and applications of commercial pro-
filing are likely to increase, many questions remain
to be answered. In the age of Big and Smart Data, of
ubiquitous computing and self-learning machines, a
clearer approach to the regulation of profiling that
gives proper consideration to both its promises and
risks, isurgently required.This reportprovideda first
overview and comparative stock-take.
